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THE RIGHT OF A MINOR TO INDEPENDENT
STATUS - THREE MODELS
Yitshak Cohen*
This article examines a minor’s right to independent status in matters
of family law, the importance and benefits of that right, the interests it
competes with, and possible approaches for the future. The right of a minor
to independent status was initially intended to resolve a concern that
parents, while undergoing divorce proceedings and focused on their own
interests, might compromise the interests of their children. I argue that this
concern has developed into a legal presumption that parents compromise
the interest of minors in divorce proceedings. However, this presumption
contradicts the assumption, fundamental to every legal system, that parents
are natural guardians who safeguard the interests of their children. In
addition, the development of a minor’s right to independent status has
several negative effects on divorce proceedings, among them: contractual
uncertainty, lack of finality of judgment, waste of judicial resources, and
prolonged divorce proceedings between parents.
This article offers the following three models for protecting the
interests of the minor: (i) requiring the court to comprehensively examine
the interests of the child and then granting a presumption of validity to the
court’s determination—that determination should also serve as binding
precedent for a subsequent court; (ii) legislating clear considerations and
guidelines for defining the best interests of the child and thereby reducing
future relitigation; and (iii) appointing independent representation for the
minor. These models may serve to create a more appropriate formula for
balancing the competing interests in family law proceedings.
*
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the number of divorce proceedings is almost
unmanageable. 1 Accordingly, the number of children involved in such
proceedings is growing every year. 2The decisions made during a couple’s
divorce proceedings have a crucial effect upon the lives, personal
development, tranquility, and security of that couple’s children. These
1

See Randall W. Leite & Kathleen Clark, Participants’ Evaluations of Aspects
of the Legal Child Custody Process and Preferences for Court Services, 45 FAM.
CT. REV. 260, 260 (2007) (“Throughout the United States, domestic relations courts
experience large, often unmanageable caseloads. In fact, domestic relations cases
are the largest and fastest growing segment of state-court civil caseloads.”)
(citations omitted).
2
See John David Meyer, The “Best Interest of the Child” Requires Independent
Representation of Children in Divorce Proceedings, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 445,
445 (1998) (“Divorce is a common occurrence that disrupts the lives of over one
million children each year, affecting their psychological and physical well-being.”)
(citations omitted).
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decisions will affect the children even though the children are usually not
parties to the proceedings that take place between their parents. The courts
have expressed concern over the conflicts of interests between parents and
children during divorce proceedings.3 When parents are involved in a
struggle over their interests and personal freedoms, they might neglect or
even compromise the interests of their children. In order to protect a child’s
interests, the courts established and strengthened the minor’s right to
independent status by determining that decisions or agreements made in the
proceedings between the parents are not binding upon the minor.4 Children
are therefore allowed to subsequently reopen such agreements in a new
proceeding initiated on their behalf.5 In this relitigation proceeding, the
interests of the children appear before the court as separate and distinct from
the matters between their parents.6 This is the first opportunity for the child
to be heard. As a consequence, prior decisions that affect the minor might be
changed.
However, excessive use of the minor’s right to independent status
detracts from the finality of judgments, and can result in certain issues
remaining open and unresolved.7 This uncertainty might also be detrimental
to the motivation of the couple to resolve their dispute. The parties may
wrongfully use the minor’s right to independent status in their own conflict
as a couple. It may even burden limited judicial resources with the
relitigation of claims, while other parties with new matters wait to come
before the court. However, even though the potential for abuse exists,
limiting and restricting minors’ rights to independent status might be
detrimental to the interests of the children if their interests are compromised
in favor of their parents.
In the first Part of this article, I will examine the importance of the
right to independent status, its necessity for the protection of minors, its
place in legal systems today, and possible trends for the future. This right
3

See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 307-08 (N.M. 1991); Ford v.
Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962).
4
CA 404/70 Evron v. Evron, 25(1) PD 373, 378 [1971] (Isr.).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Leite & Clark, supra note 1, at 260-61 (“From a legal point of view, divorce
traditionally required a couple to address grounds for the divorce, property
distribution, alimony, child custody, and child support. Today, only those issues
associated with children remain open issues in most states.”) (citation omitted).
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does not exist in a legal vacuum, and it has significant implications for the
remaining interests involved in a family law matter. Therefore, in the second
Part of this article, I will evaluate the present balance between contractual
certainty, the finality of judgments, and the right of a parent not to be
repeatedly brought before the court for relitigation versus the best interests
of the child and his right to independent status. In the third and final Part of
the article, I will consider different practical models that have been used to
address a minor’s right to independent status. Throughout the article I will
draw from American, Israeli, and other foreign law to provide examples and
examine difficult scenarios. This examination may assist in building a
formula that more appropriately balances the competing interests in family
law matters.
I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MINOR’S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT STATUS
A. Finality of Judgment

The principle of finality of judgment is fundamental to legal systems.
Simply put, finality of judgment means that a matter conclusively decided
by a court of competent jurisdiction will not be relitigated between the same
parties.8 The principle of finality of judgment includes three cumulative
conditions: final resolution by a competent court, identical litigants, and the
same claim.9 The rationales at the basis of this principle include prevention
8

See, e.g., Jullie Steakley & Weldo U. Howell, Ruminations on Res Judicata,
28 SW. L.J. 355, 355 (1974) (“The doctrine of res judicata…[states] that a cause of
action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits,
by a competent tribunal, cannot afterwards be litigated by new proceedings either
before the same or any other tribunal”) (citations omitted) .
9
See, e.g., Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996) (The
elements of res judicata are: “(1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a
second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in
the first action”); Wayne Cnty. v. Detroit, 233 Mich. App. 275, 277 (1998) (“Under
the doctrine of res judicata, ‘a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving
the same claim, demand or cause of action.’” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1305 (6th ed. 1990)) .
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of relitigation, the right of a litigant not to be repeatedly called back to court,
the concern over conflicting decisions made by different courts on the same
issues, and the efficient use of judicial resources.10 Therefore, once a court
has granted a final judgment, a procedural barrier arises before the parties,
preventing any relitigation between them on the same cause of action.11
The importance and effectiveness of this principle has resulted in its
expansion on several levels. For example, finality of the judgment is not
restricted only to the parties who were formally present during the first
action, but may also bar the initiation of a proceeding by others who are
privy with the parties to the earlier action. 12The classic example of this sort
of privity, as discussed in this article, is the natural guardianship of parents.
In matters associated with their children, parents are authorized to represent
them in legal actions.13 The legal significance of such representation is,
among other considerations, that a decision concerning the minors is binding
upon them and prevents them from relitigating the same matter. The
rationale behind obligating a minor by a legal proceeding in which he was
not even present is sufficiently clear: parents appropriately protect the
interest of their children. In representing the children, it is assumed the
parents do the most to ensure that the children’s interests are thoroughly
considered by the court.14 Therefore, finality of judgment is intended to
prevent the minor's relitigation.
B. Natural Guardianship
The natural presumption that parents safeguard the interests of their
children is not as simple as it seems. This presumption is challenged by the
10

CA 9085/00 Shitrit v. Sharvat Brothers Ltd, 57(5) PD 462, 475 [2003] (Isr.).
CA 246/66 Klosner v. Shimony, 22(2) PD 561, 583 [1968] (Isr.).
12
See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800-01 (Tex.
1992) (People can be in privity in at least three ways: (1) they can control an action
even if they are not parties to it; (2) their interests can be represented by a party to
the action; or (3) they can be successors in interest, deriving their claims through a
party to the prior action) ; Mathison v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 2 of Jackson
Cnty., 401 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Mo. 1966) (“to make one ‘privy’ to an [earlier] action
he must have acquired his interest in the subject matter of the action subsequent to
the commencement of the suit or rendition of judgment.”).
13
Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722 – 1962, 380 Laws of the State of Israel
(LSI) 120, §§ 14-15 (1962) (Isr.).
14
See Getty, 845 S.W.2d at 800-01.
11
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concern that parents who are in the midst of divorce proceedings, struggling
over their own personal matters, including freedom—and sometimes even
motivated by the desire for revenge—may unknowingly or unintentionally
compromise the interests of their minor children. When one spouse focuses
on proving his own parenting skills and abilities, or the other spouse’s lack
thereof, that spouse may fail to properly consider the children’s interests.
The picture presented to the court may be distorted if the atmosphere in the
divorce proceedings is controversial and charged. Since the spouses are
concerned with personal gain, the interests presented before the court are
their own and not necessarily the interests of their children. 15 In addition,
divorce proceedings sometimes cause a rift between children and their
parents. Consequently, parents may not be sensitive to or aware of the needs
of their children. Moreover, the interests of the parents may sometimes be
at odds with their children’s interests. For example, while in principle, broad
visitation arrangements with both parents are in the best interests of the
child, it is certainly possible that the noncustodial parent will prefer more
restricted visitation that will not burden him in finding new work or in
establishing a new family.
Legal systems in the United States are aware of the gap that exists
between the interests of parents and those of their children during divorce
proceedings.16 In the case of Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, the court stated:
When, however, the interests of a third party (or parties—
the children) are not only significantly affected by the
outcome of the litigation but indeed are paramount in
determining that outcome, placing on one party the burden
of establishing that his or her interests are the ones that
should be vindicated can subordinate the interests of the
third party—who may be absent and may not even be
represented—in the clash over the other two parties’
competing hopes and desires.17

15

Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All
That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. FAM. L. 27, 31 (1977) .
16
See, e.g., Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990); Taff v.
Bettcher, 646 A.2d 875, 878 (Conn. App. 1994) .
17
Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 307-08 (N.M. 1991) .
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Similarly, the alienation that might occur between parents during
divorce proceedings could negatively impact their parental judgment with
respect to the interests of their children.18
C. The Right of the Minor to Independent Status
The concern that parents might compromise the interests of their
children is not merely an academic or theoretical issue. A proceeding
between parents, especially when uncontested or resolved by agreement,
does not bind a subsequent court in matters that only concern the child.19
Such matters are brought before a court apart from earlier proceedings that
involved the parents.20 A parent should not be permitted to purchase his
personal freedom at the cost of his child’s peace and safety, even if the court
approves such an agreement.
In Guillermo v. Guillermo, the Family Court in Mexico confirmed a
divorce agreement, which determined, among other issues, that the father
would pay fifteen dollars a week for child support.21 Eight months
thereafter, the mother brought a claim against the father, on behalf of the
child, before a different court of parallel jurisdiction.22 She argued that the
amount of support did not meet the needs of the child.23 The court held that
in some cases the mother might be so anxious to end her marriage that she
may compromise her children’s needs for a matrimonial decree.24
The court further stated that there had been no change in either the
child’s or the father’s circumstances since the initial judgment.25 The court
noted that the only change was simply that of the mother’s own situation.26
While she had previously been constrained by her matrimonial dispute, eight
18

Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (“Unfortunately, experience has
shown that the question of custody, so vital to a child's happiness and well-being,
frequently cannot be left to the discretion of parents. This is particularly true where,
as here, the estrangement of husband and wife beclouds parental judgment with
emotion and prejudice.”).
19
CA 42/49 Mashkeh v. Mashkeh, 3(1) PD 88 (1950)(Isr.).
20
Id.
21
Guillermo v. Guillermo, 252 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (1964) .
22
Id.
23
See id. at 172-73.
24
Id. at 173.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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months later she was free to litigate.27 This change, for the first time,
enabled the mother to independently raise the issue of support of her minor
child.28 The court indicated that the ruling of the previous court relied only
on the divorce agreement of the parties: there was no discussion,
interrogation process, or examination of the needs of the child.29 The court
concluded that according to the income of the father, he was required to pay
child support in an amount fifty percent higher than the amount previously
determined.30 The court stated that when matrimonial litigation is
uncontested or results in a settlement between the parties, the incidental
provision of child support cannot control a subsequent court where the
interests of the child are first considered separate and apart from the earlier
proceedings between the parents.31
No parent should be able to bind a child by buying
matrimonial freedom at the price of selling a child's material
or other security, even if a court approves such agreement . .
. . No child support decree should be sacrosanct if
“incidental” to, and inequitably incidental to, the problems
of adults.32
A minor has no control over the process or the strategies used.
Therefore, the findings should not obligate him. In sum, because children
are not privy to their parents in divorce proceedings, they should not be
bound by the results of proceedings that take place between their parents.33
The most important implication of these concerns is the development
of the minor’s right to independent status. Accordingly, a voluntary
agreement between the parents in matters concerning the child is not binding

27

Id.
Id.
29
Id. at 178.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 181.
32
Id.
33
See, e.g., Simcox v. Simcox, 546 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Ill. 1989) (“We, therefore,
hold that children are not privies of their parents in dissolution proceedings and, as
such, are not bound by findings of paternity in such proceedings unless they are
parties to the proceedings.”) (emphasis in original).
28
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upon the child—even if approved by the court.34 Merely including the
minors in the proceedings and having the parents declare that they are
creating an agreement in the interests of their children does not make any
difference.35 The child is allowed to initiate a new legal proceeding in a
matter that was previously determined by the court, even if there is no
material change of circumstances that would otherwise be necessary to
justify relitigation.
It is interesting to note that under the Israeli legal system, as opposed
to that in the United States, the change that takes place in the status of the
minor also affects those circumstances in which the right to independent
status applies. For many years, the presumption that parents might
compromise the interest of their children applied exclusively to issues of
child support. In all remaining matters, the agreement between the divorcing
parents was binding upon the minor. 36In recent years, however, the concern
that parents may compromise the interests of their children has arisen with

34

Id.
In the Israeli legal system, it is insufficient to merely determine that the
agreement meets the needs of the child and serves his best interest. Two procedural
conditions must be fulfilled for it to be binding upon the minor: (1) a separate claim
on behalf of the minor, and (2) a separate proceeding in his matter, that is not
connected to the remaining issues of the divorce. See, e.g., CA 404/70 Evron v.
Evron, 25(1) PD 373, 378 [1971] (Isr.). In my opinion, Israeli law identifies three
stages in the development of a minor’s right to independent status: In the 1960s and
1970s, the determining standard was procedural. In the 1980s, the courts adopted a
more substantive model. They sought to identify if decisions concerning the minors
were indeed made in their interest, whether or not a separate proceeding was
brought on their behalf. See, e.g., CA 289/82 Dauba v. Dauba, 36(4) PD 625, 628
[1982] (Isr.); CA 82 /544 Hamami v. Hamami, 38(3) PD 605, 608 [1984] (Isr.). In the
last decade the courts again adopted the procedural standard, and in that way
broadened a minor’s right to independent status. In this third stage, even if it is
determined that the decisions made concerning a child are good, the second court
will reverse them if they were not made in a separate proceeding on behalf of the
minor. See HCJ 2898/03 Anonymous v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court, 58(2) PD
550, 563 [2004] (Isr.). The Supreme Court recently decided that the substantive
model should be determinative. See HCJ 4407/12 Anonymous v. The Supreme
Rabbinical Court (Feb. 7, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
36
CA 81 /1 Nagar v. Nagar, 38(1) PD 365, 387 [1984] (Isr.).
35
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respect to a broader variety of issues. Thus, the presumption now applies to
child custody and visitation,37 as well as matters of education in Israel.38
The establishment and broadening of the minor’s right to independent
status is intended to benefit the minor and to protect his interests. The law
must protect minors from anyone who might compromise their interests,
even if that person happens to be their parent. This sort of protection is of
the utmost importance.
II.

EXCLUSION OF OTHER INTERESTS IN FAMILY LAW

Judicial decisions must balance different interests. The emphasis of
one interest is generally at the expense of another. In this Part, I will more
closely examine the negative costs that the right of a minor’s independent
status has on other interests.
A. Res Judicata and the Burden of Proof
Among the first interests to be compromised by the minor’s right of
independent status are the interests incorporated in the doctrine of res
judicata, and principles concerning finality of judgment, such as prevention
of relitigation, functus officio,39 the right of a party not to repeatedly face
claims on the same matter; prevention of burdening the court with
relitigation while new claims are waiting to be heard;40 and other finality
considerations.41 Certainly, the principle of res judicata in family law is

37

HCJ 2898/03 Anonymous v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court, 58(2) PD 550,
563 [2004] (Isr.).
38
HCJ 9539/00 Eitan v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court, 56(1) 125, 133 [2001]
(Isr.).
39
CA 9085/00 Shitrit v. Sharvat Brothers Ltd, 57(5) PD 462, 475 [2003] (Isr.).
40
Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1528 (2004) (“Finally, ‘[t]he doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel are designed to preserve judicial resources by
preventing relitigation of issues that had been thoroughly aired in a prior
proceeding’” (quoting Jill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets
Vacatur, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 340 (1994))).
41
See NINA SALTZMAN, RES JUDICATA IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 3-12 (Ramot,
Univ. of Tel Aviv 1991) (in Hebrew); CA 219/87 Artzi Ltd. v. Shemesh Hadar Ltd.,
43(3) PD 489, 497 [1989] (Isr.).

10

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2015

more flexible than is customary in other areas of law.42 I have written more
extensively elsewhere about this flexibility with respect to child support,
custody, and alimony. 43In those matters, the court determined that when
there is a change in circumstances, the final decision of the court may be
modified to suit the new reality.44
In order to balance the interest of adjusting a payment amount to meet
changed circumstances, on one hand, and the interest of the finality of
judgment on the other hand, the court requires that the change be a “material
change of circumstances.”45 This balance requires two distinct conditions
that are intended to offset and “make up for” the conflict with the principle
of the finality of judgment. First, the burden of proving changed
circumstances is placed upon the individual initiating the later proceeding
and requesting to modify the earlier decision.46 Second, not every change in
42

Barry B. McGough & Gregory R. Miller, Domestic Relations, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 221 (2004) (“The court of appeals, however, held that ‘the doctrine of res
judicata is less strictly applied in divorce and alimony cases, including cases
dealing with child support issues’” (citing Dial v. Adkins, 265 Ga. App. 650, 651-52
(2004) (emphasis in original))).
43
See generally Yitshak Cohen, Issues Subject to Modification in Family Law:
A New Model, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2015).
44
See id. at 2-6.
45
See, e.g., Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody
Decrees, 94 Yale L.J. 757, 766 (1985); accord id. at 779 (“Each of the approaches
to modification applications described above represents an attempt to balance
competing policy interests. Trying to balance the policies behind the res judicata
doctrine on the one hand, and the policies in favor of making the best-advised
contemporary determination of the child's welfare on the other, the traditional
changed circumstances doctrine holds that not just any changed circumstances, but
only substantial ones, should warrant changing custody.”); Sally Burnet Sharp,
Modification of Agreement-Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard? 68
VA. L. REV. 1263, 1264 n.9 (1982) (“The change of circumstances standard is based
on principles of res judicata.”); Richard Montes, Harold J. Cohn, & Shelley L.
Albaum, The Changed-Circumstances Rule and the Best Interest of the Child, 24
L.A. LAW. 12, 12 (2001) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the rule [i.e. changed
circumstances] is to recognize the finality of judgments and protect the parties and
the child from harmful and needless relitigation of the issues of custody and
visitation.”).
46
The burden for modifying maintenance awards rests with the party seeking
modification, and the decision of whether to grant such modification is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Pala v. Loubser, 943 N.E.2d 400, 409

11
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circumstances is sufficient. Instead, a material change in circumstances is
mandatory, and meeting this burden of proof is not an easy task.47
In contrast, with respect to the right of the minor to independent
status, the conflict with the principle of res judicata is not balanced in any
way. On the contrary, the burden of proof is placed upon the individual
requesting to maintain the previous ruling without change.48 Only a few days
subsequent to a final determination in the matters concerning a couple, one
parent may initiate a new claim on behalf of the child, without being
required to prove a material or any other change in circumstances.49
Therefore, this right of independent status actually reverses the original
fundamental presumption: it assumes that the representation of the minor by
his parents in the first proceeding was not fitting representation, and thus the
minor is allowed to initiate a new proceeding to modify the result.50 The
burden shifts and is placed on the party that objects to initiating a new
proceeding.51 In other words, the burden is borne by the individual wishing
to maintain the determination that has already been adjudicated—not the
party requesting to modify it. Accordingly, the individual bearing the burden
must prove that in the earlier proceeding the representation of the minor was
appropriate.52 This requirement contradicts the natural presumption, which
assumes that a parent adequately represents his child and faithfully fulfills
his duty to protect the minor’s interests. Thus, by changing the customary
premise, the court assumes, instead, that the representation of the child by
the parents is inappropriate. Anyone arguing that the parental representation

(Ind. Ct. App.) (affirming trial court's termination of spousal maintenance), transfer
denied, 950 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2011).
47
See Wexler, supra note 45, at 766; Montes, Cohn, & Albaum, supra note 45,
at 12.
48
Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 277 (1979) (“If a judgment
determining the existence of the parent-child relationship is to be binding upon the
nonparty minor child, respondent has the burden of proving the minor was a party to
the action or in some other manner is bound prospectively by the findings and
judgment in the parents' marital dissolution action.”) .
49
Famcourt 37181/97 L.Ti v A.Ti (Nov. 26, 2002) Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
50
HCJ 6103/93 Levi v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court, 48(2) PD 591 [1994]
(Isr.).
51
Id.
52
See Ruddock, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 277.
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is proper bears the burden of proof.53 The question of the burden is far more
than a theoretical matter. It actually determines, as a matter of policy, who
will win in the litigation and who will lose.54
B. Contractual Certainty, Rehabilitation, and Motivation to Settle
The right of independent status, which is intended to focus on the
interest of the minor, might be used, instead, by one of the parents as a way
of avoiding his own obligations. A spouse—who just consented to a range
of separation and divorce conditions, including matters of joint property,
custody, or support—can go back and object to the same agreement,
53

See Jaramillo v. Jaramillo 823 P.2d 299, 307 (N.M. 1991). Placing the burden
on the party that wishes to maintain the present situation was of concern to the court
in this matter. The court determined that even though the matter involved minors, it
is appropriate to determine a presumption favoring the party that wishes to maintain
the existing situation, while the burden of proof should be imposed on the individual
requesting the change. The court stated:
When parents are operating under a joint custody arrangement and
one of them seeks to alter the arrangement, it makes perfectly
good sense to impose a presumption in favor of the parent who
wishes to continue to operate under the joint custody decree and
to place on the party wishing to change the decree the burden to
produce evidence that the arrangement is no longer workable and
needs to be changed.
Id. The court added and explained that as a rule, placing the burden on one of the
parents to justify maintaining the existing situation could result in focusing on the
question of whether or not that party met the burden, and the interests of the minor
might be hurt. Thus the court stated: “But beyond this presumption in favor of an
existing joint custody arrangement, further presumptions for or against the
relocating parent and the one who remains behind only frustrate achievement of the
ultimate goal of determining the arrangement that will best serve the child's
interests” Id. at 307. In our matter, the burden in the proceeding is not intended to
focus on the lack of trust in the parents but on the question of whether the requested
change is in the best interests of the child.
54
Id. (“In the typical bipolar model of adversary litigation—in which one
party's interests are pitted against those of the opposing party—the use of
presumptions and the assignment of burdens of proof probably effectuate, in most
instances, the relevant policy goals involved in determining who wins and who
loses.”)
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requesting it be changed on the grounds that he is not bringing his own
claim, but the claim of the minor.55 The court sometimes defines such claims
as fictitious when it becomes clear that the minor does not even know how
to express his needs or what he is lacking, or when the initiation of the
proceeding is neither the minor’s initiative nor his idea.56
The presumption of compromising the interests of the minor might
therefore be wrongfully taken advantage of by one of the spouses. In a
separate proceeding, that spouse could argue that the child had not been
properly represented, and thus he might avoid his own obligations under a
prior agreement with the other spouse. Therefore, the right of the minor to
independent status might detrimentally impact the interest of the contract
and contractual certainty, making it difficult for the couple to plan their
individual futures.57
In addition, the duality in the position taken by the court is not easily
understood. On one hand, when a parent creates an agreement with his
spouse, the court does not trust the parent to protect the interests of the
minor. On the other hand, after some time has passed, when a parent brings
a separate claim against the other spouse on behalf of the child, such trust is
granted. 58Yet, it is possible that the parent’s actual purpose in the new claim
is the continuation of the dispute with the other spouse. If the concern is that
a parent may be focused on his own interests and not on those of his child,
then it is unclear why a proceeding brought prior to the divorce is
differentiated from one brought afterwards.59
55

See D.N. 4/82 Kot v. Kot, 38(3) PD 197, 209 [1984] (Isr.).
See CA 411/76 Sher v. Sher, 32(1) PD 449, 454 [2003] (Isr.).
57
See, e.g., CA 508/70 Natovich v. Natovitch, 25(1) PD 603, 615 [1971] (Isr.).
58
See CA 289/82 Dauva v. Dauva, 36(4) PD 625, 628 [1982] (Isr.).
59
This problematic duality is also expressed in Hunter v. Hunter, 170 Cal. App.
2d 576, 583 (1959) (holding that a parent may not waive reasonably due present and
future support on behalf of his or her children, but that a parent may still make a
binding agreement about such support). What is the meaning of the validity of an
agreement between them if one party is allowed to change it in the name of the
minor? What is the difference if a parent is allowed to change the agreement in his
own name, or in the name of the minor? In Van Buskirk v. Todd, for example, we
found similar duality: on the one hand the mother is seen as one who acted on
behalf of the child and represented his interests. On the other hand, when the minor
requests to reopen the proceedings, in contradiction to the agreements that were
reached by the mother, the mother’s action is ignored. 269 Cal. App. 2d 680, 687
(1969) (“[T]he defendant could not get the case reversed by claiming for the first
56
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The minor’s right to independent status creates a sort of balance of
terrors, which threatens the parties and could become an incentive to prevent
economic rehabilitation, or at least hide it, due to concerns over relitigation.
For example, the economic rehabilitation of one spouse could encourage the
second spouse to initiate new litigation. A claim could be brought for
increased child support from the first spouse due to his improved level of
income. The flexibility of an agreement between the spouses, and the
possibility of breaching it, also negatively impacts their motivation to
resolve their dispute by agreement. The minor’s right to independent status,
as noted, places the burden on the individual requesting to preserve the
existing agreement so that the party wishing to revise it is in a more
advantageous position. This determination thwarts the completion of the
agreement.
In addition, one should also consider that maintaining the contract
between the spouses might serve the interests of the minor as well. In a
home where the parents constantly argue and the atmosphere is filled with
hate and bitterness, it is desirable and in the interest of the children that the
tension be brought to an end and that the parents divorce. In other words,
there could be situations in which the child is interested in the separation of
his parents no less than in his economic well-being.60 A low level of child
support or less than customary visitation does not necessarily mean that the
interest of the child has been compromised and that representation by his
parents is inappropriate.
From another perspective, the minor’s right of independent status
serves as a way to protect the weaker spouse. The first proceeding between
the parents takes place before the divorce decree is awarded, while the
second proceeding takes place afterwards. Following the divorce, the
spouses appear with “equal strength” in a monetary claim. It is not without
reason that suits on behalf of minors are sometimes filed only days
following the divorce. During this short period of time, the expenses for the
time on appeal that the child had no standing in court because he did not have a
guardian ad litem on the paternity issue. We will presume that the mother acted in
the manner of a guardian ad litem, and it is clear that she acted in behalf of the
minor consistently with the duties of a guardian ad litem.”) It is unclear how the
mother is viewed in one proceeding as acting on behalf of the child by obligating
the father, while at the same time she is viewed in another proceeding as acting
contrary to the child’s interests in her relationship with the child.
60
CA 411/76 Sher v. Sher, 32(1) PD 449, 454 [2003] (Isr.).
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child did not really increase, the prices of commodities did not actually
skyrocket, and the minor did not suddenly mature and discover that he lacks
adequate support. Only one thing changed: the parent who initiates the
proceeding on behalf of the child is freed from the limitations of the divorce
proceedings and is not concerned about a lack of cooperation from his
spouse.61
In Israel, for instance, the courts have welcomed relitigation in the
name of the minor, and have viewed such relitigation as an adjustment to the
divorce proceedings. Adjustment is required because there is a gap between
the ruling of the rabbinical court and the ruling of the Civil Court, which
will be filed upon relitigation.62
To that end, Israel courts have even established the minor’s right to
independent status. This right of independent status can be used by courts
not only to protect the interest of the minor, but to no lesser extent, to
protect the interest of the weaker spouse as well. Indeed, typically the
second proceeding only deals with issues associated with the minor, and not
directly with matters between the couple. However, through the issues
related to the minor it is also possible to balance and amend other concerns
that are clearly those of the couple. In essence, it is not a matter of separate
entities, and there is no absolute differentiation between payments due to the
minor and payments due to the custodial parent.
Undoubtedly, the minor’s right to independent status and the
development of that right is an excellent means of protecting the interest of
helpless minors in a legal proceeding. This right is also an excellent tool for
61

An interesting judgment in New York argues that the “release” itself
following a divorce decree constitutes a “change in circumstances.” See Guillermo
v. Guillermo, 43 Misc.2d 763, 773 (1964) (“As soon as the parent's marital freedom
is adjudicated, the parent’s ‘circumstances’ thereby ipso facto are changed by the
new freedom itself. Having been safely separated, divorced or the marriage
annulled, the parent for the first time is in a radically ‘changed’ position—to litigate
freely, to strive vigorously for an equitable order of support without fear of refusal
by the other parent to co-operate in the separation, divorce, or annulment by
consenting to appear, or by declining to controvert the proof. Here in the Family
Court, the Judge is for the first time given both sides of the circumstances as
contended for by the respective parents, and he can find the facts as they are rather
than as a separation agreement and mute parents made them appear to another
court.”) (italics in original).
62
Ariel Rosen Zvi, The Rabbinical Court, the Religious Tradition and the
Community—A Very Narrow Bridge, 3 HAIFA L. REV. 173, 178 (1995).
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safeguarding the interest of the weaker spouse. But when considering these
important advantages it is impossible to ignore the potential disadvantages
and implications of that right.
By presuming that parents compromise the interests of their children,
courts are in conflict with other fields of law.63 In other areas of law, courts
do not presume that parents compromise the interest of their children. For
example, in tort law, parents routinely represent their children. Parents
regularly act on behalf of their children through litigation and settlement
agreements.64
But, family and tort law are very different. In tort matters, the parents
are not typically opposing each other whereas in family law the parents are
typically in the midst of a controversy. A “battle” between the parents can
cloud parental judgment. Moreover, in family law, the presumption of
neglecting the interest of the minor is relevant even when the parents reach
an agreement without going through a conflict.65
In every other field of law, parents are presumed capable of
appropriately protecting the interests of their children.66 So, it should be
questioned whether the American and Israeli courts went too far in
broadening the minor’s right to independent status. It may be worthwhile to
reexamine whether the path chosen by the legal systems in the United States
and Israel is correct. Arguably, the United States and Israeli systems allow a
court of competent jurisdiction to conduct an entire proceeding while
knowing that its decisions are not binding and may subsequently be
relitigated just a few days after the first adjudication. The broadening and
establishment of the minor’s right to independent status might add to the
uncertainty and lack of peace and security that already troubles minors in
63

See CA 404/70 Evron v. Evron, 25(1) PD 373, 378 [1971] (Isr.).
See Ministry of Justice, the Committee on Children and the Law, Report of
the Subcommittee on Education, at 36 (Feb. 2003), available at
www.justice.gov.il/MOJHeb/HavaadLeZhuyot/YezugNifrad [hereinafter Rotlevy
Committee Report] (indicating that the committee did not examine the independent
representation of the minor in the area of torts since it did not see this as important
and urgent; the Committee recommended minor tort independent representation be
reviewed in the future review).
65
CA 363/81 Fayga v. Fayga, 36(3) PD 187, 189 [1982] (Isr.).
66
Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, 380 Laws of the State of Israel
(LSI) 120, §§ 14-15 (1962) (Isr.) ("The parents are the natural guardians of their
minor children. . . . The guardianship of the parents includes the obligation and the
right to care for the needs of the minor . . . and the authority to represent him.")
64
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divorce proceedings. It is not clear whether the important benefit of
independent status is greater than its cost.
III.

THREE MODELS FOR BALANCING THE COMPETING INTERESTS

The matters described above may be resolved with an appropriate
formula for balancing the competing interests: the interest of the child and
his right to independent status, as compared with, contractual interests and
the finality of judgments. In this section, I will examine three legal models
for achieving a balance among these factors.
Model A: Consideration of the Interest of the Minor by the Court
The simplest model requires the court to closely examine the interests of
the minor when it makes decisions or approves agreements on matters
concerning the minor. This requirement should bring about trust in the
court’s faithful performance of its duties. The initial assumption is that the
court appropriately considers the interests of the minor and thus properly
accounts for the child’s interests. Whoever wishes to argue otherwise should
bear the burden of proof. This would encourage parents to reach a final
agreement.
The present situation, where there is a presumption against the first
hearing, raises certain difficulties when one court allows itself to open an
agreement that was previously confirmed by another court. The subsequent
court is not a court of appeals, but shares concurrent jurisdiction with the
first one. Customarily, courts at the same level of jurisdiction will not
intervene in each other’s decisions.
However, one must also consider the limited ability of the court to
ensure that an agreement submitted for approval is indeed in the best
interests of the child. Although the court is able to subpoena witnesses and
gather evidence, it does not take it upon itself the role of managing a
proceeding. Its ability to access evidence is also limited. The court does not
seek new information, call upon experts, or even question them.
[U]nder most states' laws a court must review an agreement to
determine whether it is in the child's best interests. . . . Despite the
appearance of review, however, independent judicial inquiry is
difficult because of the inaccessibility of facts that might dictate a
different result. The result is the worst of both worlds: parents enter
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the divorce process with their autonomy to make arrangements for
their children officially abridged, and yet arrangements that might
truly be detrimental to children are unlikely to be identified.67
Despite these objective difficulties, there are instances in which the
proceeding between the parents is binding upon the children without
requiring further action.68 Additional litigation, separate from the other
issues of divorce, may not even be necessary. Similarly, the minor may not
need to be added as a party to the proceeding. An “identity of interests”
between parent and child is often sufficient to render the proceedings
binding upon the child. In other words, when the parent shares common
interests with the minor whom he represents, the legal proceeding is viewed
as binding on the minor as well, even if the minor takes no part in the legal
proceeding. For example, in Armstrong v. Armstrong, children whose
parents went through divorce proceedings requested an increase in the
amount of their support.69 Their mother brought a claim on their behalf.70
These proceedings sought a result contradicting the prior proceeding
between the parents.71 Normally, a court assumes the interest of the children
may be overshadowed by the interest of the parents and thereby
compromised. In this case, however, the interest of the mother was identical
to that of the children and therefore her representation of the children was
proper. The court determined:
The doctrinal reach of the res judicata bar extends, however, to
those persons “in privity with” parties . . . .We have previously held
that privity exists where the person involved is “ . . . so identified in
interest with another that he represents the same legal right.” . . . In
the present case, plaintiffs’ mother was entrusted with their care and
custody and was a proper representative of their interests. While in
similar situations we can conceive of a commingling of interests of
parent and child in the negotiation of a marital dissolution
agreement to the degree that the future interests of a child are clearly
67

AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2002).
68

See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 951 (1976).
See id. at 945.
70
See id. at 945-47.
71
See id. at 945-46.
69
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and deliberately subordinated to the present interests and advantages
of a parent, the record before us discloses no such circumstances.
For this reason, we conclude that plaintiffs are bound by the
judgment in the divorce action to which their mother was a party.72
Identity of interests is the standard that determines whether a minor is
bound by a proceeding in which he was not present.73 When identity of
interests is appropriately applied during the initial divorce proceedings, the
court’s determination is binding upon a subsequent court.74
The American and Israeli legal systems should require that the court’s
confirmation of the agreement between the parties not be a mere rubber
stamp, but instead, be aimed at ensuring proper and sufficient protection of
the interests of the minor. In other words, a clear presumption should be
established that the prior court’s confirmation incorporates within it the
concern for and examination of the needs of the child. Ideally, this
presumption would also determine that the prior legal proceeding is binding
on the minor.
However, since a court’s decision does not presently prevent subsequent
proceedings, each case actually remains open, even when the court has

72
Id. at 951 (citations omitted); accord Stevens v. Kelley 57 Cal. App. 2d 318,
323-24 (1943); Murdock v. Eddy 38 Cal. App. 2d 551, 553-554 (1940); Ruddock v.
Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 276 (1979) (“Under California law children who are not
parties to a divorce action still may be bound by some aspects of a marital
dissolution proceeding if the interests of the child are adequately represented by one
of the parents.”) .
73
See Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 653 (Tex. 1996) (“To
determine whether subsequent plaintiffs are in privity with prior plaintiffs, we
examine the interests the parties shared. . . . Privity exists if the parties share an
identity of interests in the basic legal right that is the subject of litigation.”) (citation
omitted).
74
See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 210 (1933) (“The provision
which the Georgia law makes of permanent alimony for the child during minority is
a legal incident of the divorce proceeding. As that suit embraces within its scope the
disposition and care of minor children, jurisdiction over the parents confers eo ipso
jurisdiction over the minor's custody and support. Hence, by the Georgia law, a
consent (or other) decree in a divorce suit, fixing permanent alimony for a minor
child is binding upon it, although the child was not served with process, was not
made a formal party to the suit, and no guardian ad litem was appointed therein.”).
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confirmed the divorce agreement between the parties.75 Today, the
confirmation by the court is not considered final because the court acts
according to the definitions and the terms determined by law—such as the
“best interests of the child,” which can be interpreted with flexibility. Courts
have broad discretion and, therefore, each court may view the issues
differently, resulting in relitigation with respect to the level of child support,
visitations, etc.
This problem can be resolved, or at least limited, by determining clearer
definitions for identifying the child’s best interests. The following section,
examines such a model.
Model B: Clear Legislative Guidelines
In the United States legal system, before state child support guidelines
were set forth for determining child support, court decisions relied on vague
standards such as “the best interest of the child,” and “substantial change in
circumstances.”76 Reliance on these abstract terms was problematic for the
legal system because courts interpreted the terms differently.77 This broad
judicial discretion resulted in inconsistency when courts awarded economic
child support and determined the adequacy of spousal support. Later courts
found the earlier court decisions to be erroneous and sought to change them,
even if no change in circumstances had occurred. 78This prevented finality of
judgment in family law cases involving decisions regarding children.

75

See, e.g., CA 404/70 Evron v. Evron, 25(1) PD 373, 378 [1971] (Isr.).
Jeffrey C. Sorenson, Changing the Changed Circumstances Requirement: A
New Standard for Modifying Permanent Custody Orders, 23 J. JUV. L. 90, 97-99
(2003) (concluding that the best interests of the child should replace the standard of
change in circumstances). But cf. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgment: Against the Best
Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-29 (1987).
77
See, e.g., Elster, supra note 76, at 4-8 (arguing the best interests of the child
standard is problematically indeterminate).
78
Hill v. Hill, 620 P.2d 1114, 1119 (Kan. 1980) (“[W]here a custody decree is
entered in a default proceeding, and the facts are not substantially developed and
presented to the court, the trial court may later, in its discretion, admit and consider
evidence as to facts existing at the time of the earlier order, and upon the full
presentation of the facts the court may enter any order which could have been made
at the initial hearing whether a ‘change in circumstances’ has since occurred or
not.”).
76
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Historically, the United States Congress has been concerned about
possible harm to minors not awarded adequate child support.79 Awarding
low amounts of support places a heavy burden on American assistance
organizations.80 In the mid-1980s, Congress expressed concern “about the
adequacy of child support awards.”81 In 1984, Congress conditioned its aid
to states and assistance organizations on the development of clear guidelines
for child support.82 In 1988, Congress further demanded that these
guidelines be given the validity of a presumption in legal proceedings.83
Thus, a litigant who wished to overcome that presumption had to provide
justification.84 In light of this requirement, guidelines have been defined in
each of the fifty states.85 Child support requirements are usually formulated
based on estimates of the minimal expenses spent on children in two-parent
families.86 The amount of basic child support is calculated as a certain
percentage of parental income.87
In every state, clear standards and guidelines have been established
for calculating child support and enforcing payment.88 The establishment of
79

Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations,
8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2001).
80
In the past, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDS), and today,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). See Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105;
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1997).
81
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, supra note 79, at 13.
82
42 U.S.C.A. § 667 (West).
83
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–485, § 126, 102 Stat. 2343,
2346 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 667 (West)). Congress passed the Family
Support Act (FSA) in 1988 and created the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child
Support. The FSA required that by October 1989 each state adopt a child support
law using a mathematic formula to establish a support award guideline.
84
Id.
85
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, supra note 79, at 13.
86
Id.
87
Id. (“All states now calculate the basic child support obligation as a
percentage of parent earnings.”).
88
Id. State law governs family law, and each state is allowed to create its own
laws. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (“[T]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
State, and not to the laws of the United States.” (citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890))); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) .
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these guidelines encourages the finality of child support judgments in
disputes.
Similarly, the system in Australia was also criticized for its
inconsistency due to a lack of guidelines.89 These objections brought about
reform in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (CSA).90 In order to
improve the processes of assessment and payment, the new Australian law
removed from the courts the authority to determine the level of economic
child support and transferred it to an administrative body that operates
according to a structured formula.91 The formula provides quick and easy
determinations of the level of child support that the non-custodial parent is
required to pay.92 Initially, it was possible to appeal the decision of the
administrative body to the courts. Today, the CSA is the entity from which
parties can request changes in set formulas.93 The removal of this authority
from the courts narrowed the discretion in the matter and resulted in greater
certainty and finality.
Under the Canadian legal system, the courts also had broad discretion
with no real guidelines.94 Unavoidably, a situation of uncertainty and
inconsistency developed with respect to the level of economic child support.
This vagueness was detrimental to the willingness of the parents to
voluntarily reach agreement regarding the level of support, and it
encouraged them to initiate legal proceedings.95 As a result, the Federal
Child Support Guidelines were created in Canada. The Guidelines are
designed to ensure certainty, consistency, restriction of the court’s

89

Belinda Fehlberg & Mavis Maclean, Child Support Policy in Australia and
the United Kingdom: Changing Priorities but a Similar Tough Deal for Children?,
23 INT’L J.L. POL. & FAM. 1, 3 (2009).
90
See Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) Part 5 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/csa1989294/.
91
Id. at Part 5.
92
Id.
93
Fehlberg & Maclean, supra note 89, at 6-7.
94
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA, CHILDREN COME FIRST: A REPORT TO
PARLIAMENT REVIEWING THE PROVISIONS AND OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES 1 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fllf/child-enfant/rp/pdf/v1.pdf.
95
Id.
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discretion, and especially important to our matter—the finality of
judgment.96
In contrast, the Israeli legal system does not clearly define the level of
child support obligation. The payment amount is determined according to
the personal (religious) law of the individual required to pay the support.97
Under this law, only the father is obligated to provide the “necessary
support” for his children.98 That term is certainly abstract. Thus, the rabbinic
court and the civil court, which have parallel jurisdiction with respect to the
level of child support, have different outcomes.99 On June 5, 2006, the
Israeli minister of justice appointed the Committee to Examine the Issue of
Child Support in the State of Israel, chaired by Professor Shifman.100 On
September 20, 2012 the committee presented its recommendations.101 The
findings of the committee show that awards are even inconsistent among the
judges in civil court.102 While the court has determined a minimum level of
child support, the determination of the maximum level of support is more
problematic. 103Therefore, the committee recommended the establishment of
a formula for child support according to the existing Australian model.104
96

See Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 §15 (2nd Supp.) (Can.); see also Federal
Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-195 (Can.), available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-3-2nd-supp/latest/rsc-1985-c-32nd-supp.html.
97
See Family Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, 5719 – 1959, 276 Laws of
the State of Israel (LSI) 72, § 2 (1959) (Isr.) (“A person is responsible for spousal
support, according to the rules of the personal law applicable to him”).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Report of the Committee to Examine the Issue of Child Support in the State
of Israel (Shifman Committee), at 106 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter: Shifman
Committee Report].
101
Id. at 3.
102
Id. at 25; see also Mor Yogev & Ayelet Giladi, Mom Give Me Equality, 3
Hearat Din 1, 6 (2006); HCJ 5969/94 Aknin v. The Rabbinical Court (Haifa), 50(1)
PD 370, Para. 11 [1996] (Isr.). (acknowledging that different interpretations are
given to the required level of child support but stating that this is not a desirable
conclusion).
103
Famcourt 3400-09-10 Anonymous v Anonymous, (Nevo 29/10/2010) Para
19.
104
Shifman Committee Report, supra note 100, at 59 (“The bill formulated by
the committee is based primarily on the Australian model founded on the
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This formula will prevent judicial discretion, and hopefully even the need
for separate relitigation of a claim on behalf of the minor.
Under both the United States and the Israeli legal systems, the issues
of custody and visitation have no uniform standards and are thus subject to
relitigation.
From a legal point of view, divorce traditionally required a
couple to address grounds for the divorce, property
distribution, alimony, child custody, and child support.
Today, only those issues associated with children remain
open issues in most states. Additionally, while all 50 states
have enacted some form of standardized child support
calculation and child support enforcement networks, both
child custody and visitation remain often hotly contested
issues in divorce proceedings.105
Therefore, uniform standards, through legislation, may bring about
finality to these matters. Uniform guidelines will undoubtedly contribute to
the finality of judgment, strengthen the principles of res judicata and
contractual certainty, and prevent misuse of the minor’s right to independent
status in the dispute between spouses.
Model C: Independent Representation for the Minor
Some legal systems do not allow parents to enter agreements on
behalf of their children. While parents may discuss their own matters in
connection with divorce agreements, they know in advance that the issues
involving their children are not subject to negotiation at all.
It is worth examining whether a similar model should be adopted in
all legal systems, so that parents in divorce proceedings will be able to
determine only matters affecting themselves—such as distribution of family
property—but not matters associated with the minor. For this proposal to be
enacted, it should be considered in conjunction with the model described
below.

assumption that a fixed percentage of the joint parental income is allocated to the
needs of their children.”).
105
Leite & Clark , supra note 1, at 260-61 (citation omitted).
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It seems that one of the most practical proposals for resolving the
concerns discussed above, or at least for preventing their exacerbation, is
including the minor in the proceedings between his parents by the
appointment of an independent representative for the minor.106 This modern
approach recognizes the need for independent representation of the minor,
due to the concern that the parents may subordinate the minor’s interests in
favor of their own. The independent representation for the minor ensures
that the process of factual investigation will be protected, and that parents
will not subsequently relitigate subjects that have already been determined.
Preserving the finality of judgment is of the utmost importance, and
independent representation serves this goal.107 John Speca and Robert
Wehrman analyzed all the cases in the Missouri regarding the inherent
jurisdiction of the court to appoint temporary representation for a minor, and
came to the clear conclusion that children have their own rights, and only
receive adequate protection in divorce proceedings when they have
independent representation.108 Despite this modern approach, only
Wisconsin requires a separate attorney to independently represent a minor in
divorce proceedings.109 The remaining states grant broad judicial discretion
for appointing a guardian ad litem for a minor in a legal proceeding:
Several other states have adopted the provisions of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which provide the
court with discretionary power to appoint a guardian ad
litem for a minor or dependent child in proceedings for
support, custody, and visitation.110
106

The authority to appoint representation for the minor exists under Israeli law.
See Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1692, 16 LSI 106, § 29 (1962) (Isr.). It
requires limiting the natural guardianship of the parents, showing the court a special
reason justifying the limitation, and hearing the parents: “If guardianship of one
parent was limited, the court may, in addition to the parents, to appoint a guardian
for minor for matters be prescribed by him.” Id.
107
S. v. S., 595 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (“First, the modern trend
of authority recognizes the necessity for independent representation of a child when
the parents in a dispute over the custody of the child do not, in any proper sense,
protect the best interests of the child.”) .
108
John Speca & Robert L. Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of Children in
Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1, 38-40 (1969) .
109
Meyer, supra note 2, at 446 (citing Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.045 (West 1993)).
110
Id.
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But, several of the states within the United States grant judicial
discretion to appoint independent representation for the matters of minors. 111
In certain American states, the appointment of the minor’s representative
and that representative’s responsibilities and duties are broadly determined
in legislation 112including the representative’s independent investigation of
the evidence. 113 Many scholars argue that it is not sufficient to rely on the
courts or parents to protect the interest of minors. 114 Instead, these scholars
argue that independent representation must be appointed for the minor.115
The importance of independent representation is emphasized in the
adversary system of law, in which the court relies on the evidence of the
parties and does not gather it by itself. 116
The Australian legal system also defined the principles for appointing
independent representation, giving parties a non-exhaustive list of possible
arguments for independent representation. 117 In the Canadian legal system,
there are still no clear instructions as to when and how to appoint an
independent representative, but the courts have broad discretion to make
such determinations. 118Canadian judicial decisions offer three different
111

Tari Eitzen, A Child’s Right to Independent Legal Representation in a
Custody Dispute, 19 FAM. L.Q. 53, 67 (1985) .
112
See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF COURT, RULE 5.240 (2014); UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT §310 (1973) .
113
2012 S.C. Acts 361, § 63-3-830 (“(A) The responsibilities and duties of a
guardian ad litem include . . . (1) representing the best interest of the child; (2)
conducting an independent, balanced, and impartial investigation to determine the
facts relevant to the situation of the child and the family….”) .
114
See, e.g., Robert F. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern Family Law, 2
J. FAM. L. 101, 107 (1962) (asking whether it would make sense for a court to
provide detailed obligations of parents); Robert W. Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem in
Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the Child's Interests, 4 J. FAM. L. 181,
181-82 (1964) .
115
Drinan, supra note 114, at 103. See generally Hansen, supra note 114.
116
Marshall A. Levin, Guardian Ad Litem in Family Court, 34 MD. L. REV. 341
(1974) (“[W]ithout meaningful representation of the interests of the child, the
adversary system cannot properly effectuate the legal test of what is in the ‘best
interest’ of the child.”).
117
Stefureak v. Chambers, [2004] 6 R.F.L. 6th 212, para. 73 (Can.).
118
Puszczak v. Puszczak, [2005] 56 Alta. L.R. 4th 225, para 11 (Can.) ABCA
426, para. 11 (Can.) (“The case law in Canada is not highly developed in setting out
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models for characterizing the nature of independent representation of
minors: “the amicus curiae, the litigation guardian, and the child advocate.”
119

The child advocate model is similar to other approaches that view the
independent representation of the minor as the most efficient way to ensure
the minor is accorded “zealous” representation. This model emphasizes the
autonomy of the minor as a client and the importance of her participation as
a party to the legal proceeding. This representation advances the interest of
the child because the court does not view the child as an individual requiring
protection and consideration, but rather as an individual with rights. Thus
explains Barbara Ann Atwood, a leading scholar:
[T]hose who endorse a child's attorney model emphasize the
child’s basic right to have his or her wishes presented by a
zealous advocate. Proponents emphasize the child client’s
autonomy and the value to the child and to the court of the
child’s participation in the proceedings. Under this
approach, the child’s dignity interests are served when the
child has a representative committed to advocating the
child's preferences.120
This model may balance the concern over possible harm to the child’s
interests, and result in the finality of judgment. However, while this model
seems tempting, it would burden the legal proceeding. Another “zealous”
attorney joining the dispute between the spouses might prolong the
proceedings and delay the resolution of the conflict. 121 In addition, the
guidelines to determine when counsel should be appointed in private custody cases
and how that should be accomplished.”) .
119
Dormer v. Thomas, [1999] 65 B.C.L.R. 3d 290, para. 44 (Can.).
120
Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children: The Ongoing Search for
Clear and Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 183, 194
(2005) (citations omitted) .
121
For example, in the case of A.M., an attorney was appointed for the independent representation of a minor. This attorney requested, on behalf of the minor,
to bring his own evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to retain an expert on his
behalf, etc. See A.M. (Guardian ad litem of) v. K.A.A.M., [2008] N.J. No.
267 (“The child argued that he was granted a role as a fully participating party and
sought to call evidence, question witnesses and retain experts. The mother agreed
with the child. The father objected to the child making applications”) .
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minor’s attorney might increase the animosity between the spouses. Lucy
McGough, another leading scholar, argues that adding another attorney to an
already charged atmosphere could cause more disagreements, additional
lack of clarity regarding the role of the court as a protector of minors, and
increase the costs of the proceeding.122 For these reasons, an attorney is only
occasionally appointed to represent a minor.123
Due to these concerns, McGough argues that the appointment of an
attorney for independent representation is not justified in regular
circumstances, though it would be correct to grant the court authority to
appoint an attorney in exceptional instances where the interests of the
parents severely conflict with those of the children.124 In that context, the
appointment of the guardian may be limited only to the specific proceedings
(i.e. litigation guardian). This temporary guardian can also serve as a
mediator or arbitrator between the parents and provide recommendations to
the court. McGough suggests not appointing an attorney in this role, since
an attorney generally lacks professional training in child development and
family dynamics. She proposes that it would be preferable to appoint
professionals in the therapeutic field. 125 This approach is similar the model
used in Canada for appointing an independent representative—a friend of
the court (amicus curiae).

122

Lucy S. McGough, Protecting Children in Divorce: Lessons from Caroline
Norton, 57 ME. L. REV. 13, 26 (2005) (“Throwing another lawyer into the fray,
however, may not be the solution. The third attorney may compound or even create
unnecessary adversarialness in the trial, cause additional confusion about the court's
role as the protector of the child, produce delay, and add to the costs of the case.
The persuasiveness of these counterarguments explains why separate counsel is
rarely appointed for the child.”) .
123
Id.
124
Id. at 27.
125
Id. at 26-27 (“More states authorize the appointment of a guardian ad litem
for the child. The guardian need not be an attorney . . . . Aside from needless
expense and role confusion, lawyers or guardians typically have no special
knowledge of child development or family dynamics . . . .why not appoint a child
psychiatrist or child psychologist who can conduct an investigation, interview all
parties, analyze the child's best interests, and tell the court how it should decide?”)
(citations omitted) .
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Similarly, in Israel, the Rotlevy Committee126 looked into this matter
within the Israeli legal system. The committee found that independent
representation of a child by an attorney does not cause the lengthening of the
proceedings.127 To the contrary, since the attorney is not subject to
considerations of bureaucracy and budget, the attorney makes sure that the
matter proceeds quickly.128 The Rotlevy Committee also rejected the
concern over additional figures in the life of the child, arguing that it is
possible to require the attorney to maintain an ongoing and trustworthy
relationship with the child throughout the entire proceeding.129 Formal
measures could also be established to ensure permanent representation. The
Rotlevy Committee determined that clear and defined criteria for the
appointment of representation safeguards parental authority.130 The
Committee determined that, from a legal perspective, it is preferable that the
duty of representation remain with an attorney, and not with a welfare
officer or similar official who may be subject to the considerations of
welfare offices, policy, budgets, and additional factors that are not always
consistent with the interests of the child.131 The Rotlevy Committee further
stated that the approach of the welfare officer is through a broad family
perspective that does not focus specifically on the child as required for
independent representation.132 The committee members did not discuss how
independent representation could influence the other issues of concern
raised in this article.
Decisions reached in proceedings where an independent
representative is appointed for the minor should be given the validity of a
final judgment. Such matters should not be open to future relitigation based
on the claim that the interest of the minor did not receive proper
representation.
126

The Rotlevy Public Committee on Children and the Law, chaired by Judge
Saviona Rotlevy, was appointed by the justice minister in Israel on June 27, 1997.
This committee was divided into six subcommittees. One of the subcommittees
dealt with “Independent Representation of Children in Civil Proceedings.” The
subcommittee’s report was submitted to the Minister of Justice in February of 2003.
See Rotlevy Committee Report, supra note 64.
127
Id. at 97.
128
Id. at 100.
129
Id. at 102.
130
Id. at 103.
131
Id. at 114.
132
Id. at 115.
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Some legal systems include therapeutic professional assistance units
associated with the family court. The professionals’ appointment as
independent representatives for minors is easy to arrange and may lessen the
costs of the proceedings, assuming the professionals are qualified to serve
on behalf of the minors. This method is effective because it adds the minor
as a party to the proceedings, ensuring the finality of judgment and
protecting the interests derived from it. Legal systems that provide attorneys
for minors, such as these, contribute significantly to the efficiency of these
types of proceedings. 133
In light of the different models for appointing legal representation for
a minor, either the legislator or the court should resolve the remaining
uncertainties. The duties, obligations, and limitations of independent
representation need to be clearly defined. As long as the roles of the
representatives for minors are uncertain, the court will refrain from
appointing them.
CONCLUSION
Parents in the midst of divorce proceedings may compromise the
interests of their children. The increased risk of conflicts of interests
between parents and children, coupled with the worsening of the scope and
severity of divorce disputes, have strengthened the presumption that parents
may compromise the interests of their children. In response to apparent
concern for the minor’s right to independent status, the courts allow
relitigation in divorce proceedings. Courts allow relitigation even if the
children are considered in the initial proceedings and the parents make
statements regarding their interests in the children. The burden of proof is
borne by the individual wishing to maintain the previously adjudicated
determination—not by the child requesting the modification. The right to
independent status, therefore, provides important protection for the interests
of the minor.
133

A.I. v. Ontario (Director, Child and Family Services Act), [2005] 136 CRR
(2d) 13, para. 141-42 (“The OCL [Office of the Children’s Lawyer] is statutorily
mandated to act in the best interests of the children it represents. It is axiomatic,
therefore, that a position taken by the OCL is one which the OCL believes to be in
the best interests of the child. . . . The OCL is frequently an invaluable resource to
this court, and I find this case no exception. I found the OCL's involvement to be
very helpful.”) .
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On the other hand, this right enables courts to reverse earlier judicial
decisions, based on the argument that the decisions were detrimental to the
minor. The presumption of compromising the interests of the minor and its
impact on the possibility of relitigation is detrimental to contractual
certainty and finality of judgments. A spouse who just consented to a range
of separation and divorce conditions can object to that agreement and
request that the agreement be modified by bringing a claim on behalf of the
minor.
This sort of relitigation enables one spouse to prolong the dispute: it
creates an incentive to prevent economic rehabilitation out of concern for
possible future relitigation, negatively impacts the motivation of a couple to
resolve their dispute by agreement, wastes precious judicial resources and
brings about relitigation while other new claims are waiting to be heard for
the first time, and misleads the couple who believes the legal proceeding
will allow each of them to begin a new path in life. Courts may have gone
too far in establishing the right of the minor to independent status given that
the right may even be an obstacle to the minor.
Three models better balance the competing interests. The first model
requires the court to comprehensively protect the interests of the child, and
then grant a presumption of validity to the court’s determination. The initial
assumption should be that the court appropriately considers the interests of
the minor, and thus properly accounts for the child’s interests. Whoever
wishes to argue otherwise should bear the burden of proof. That
determination should also serve as binding precedent for a subsequent court.
The second model suggests creating clear legislative guidelines for
defining the best interests of the child in order to avoid future relitigation.
The establishment of guidelines for child support results in the finality of
child support judgments in later disputes. The American, Australian, and
Canadian systems adopt this approach, to varying extents. Some of the
systems have even transferred the determination of child support matters to
administrative entities, drastically restricting judicial discretion. These
entities implement an established formula based on the objective data of the
parents; this standardized system makes it difficult to initiate relitigation by
arguing that the interest of the minors was compromised. The Israeli system
is likely to move in this direction as well, though it currently still relies on
abstract terms in determining child support, making it easier to relitigate on
behalf of the minor.
The third model appoints independent representation for the minor.
Such representation adds the minor as a party to the proceedings, thereby
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ensuring finality of judgment. Decisions in proceedings with independent
representatives should be given the validity of a final judgment. Several
models are available for determining who should serve as the minor’s
representative, including a zealous attorney, a social worker, or a friend of
the court.
These models, or a combination of them, can be used to create a
formula for more appropriately balancing the competing interests and
concerns in family law proceedings. Such a system could protect the
interests of the minor while, at the same time, preserving contractual
certainty and the stability of agreements between spouses.
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